The Energy Transition Will Be Built with Metals

The energy transition will not be built on ambition alone — copper, aluminium, nickel, cobalt and lithium form the material foundation of global electrification and net-zero delivery. © RT Graphica

❮ Insights

Getting to grips with supply of the Big Five


⟁ OPINION  |  Arno Saffran, Mon 16 Feb, 2026

I have observed a tendency in the climate debate to speak in abstractions: ambition, pathways, targets, commitments. Net zero by 2050. A 1.5°C world. Accelerated electrification. But the transition will not be delivered in abstractions. It will be delivered in materials.

The energy transition will be built with metals. Electrification now sits at the centre of industrial strategy across the United States, Europe and Asia. Wind turbines, solar parks, transmission grids, battery storage, electric vehicles, charging networks — the visible architecture of decarbonisation is expanding rapidly.

Less visible, but more fundamental, is the material reality beneath it. Every turbine nacelle, every kilometre of high-voltage cable, every battery pack rests on a concentrated set of inputs. Strip those away and the transition stalls.

The Big Five

The transition is, in material terms, a story about five metals: copper, aluminium, nickel, cobalt and lithium.

Each plays a distinct, non-substitutable role.

  • Copper is the circulatory system of electrification — wiring, motors, grid expansion, renewables integration.

  • Aluminium enables lightweighting in electric vehicles and strengthens transmission infrastructure.

  • Nickel, cobalt and lithium form the chemical backbone of modern battery technologies, powering both mobility and grid storage.

Demand for these metals does not rise incrementally under decarbonisation. It shifts structurally. Even under relatively modest transition scenarios, copper and aluminium demand could rise by roughly a third by 2040. Nickel demand expands far faster. Lithium and cobalt move into entirely new orders of magnitude — multiples, not percentages. Under a 2°C or lower pathway, growth rates double again. This is not cyclical uplift. It is systemic transformation.

The Scale of the Build-Out

To grasp the magnitude, consider electric vehicles alone. Moving from today’s fleet to tens of millions of EVs annually within a decade requires exponential scaling of battery production capacity, upstream refining and raw material extraction.

The closest historical analogue is China’s infrastructure boom in the early 2000s — a period that redrew global commodity markets for a generation. Yet even that transformation was concentrated in steel and iron ore. The transition ahead is broader and more chemically complex.

For certain metals, this will feel like the China supercycle — but electrified.

And here lies the tension: mining projects are measured in decades, while climate ambition is measured in years.

Capital

Supplying the Big Five at the pace required will demand capital on a scale that is not yet fully internalised by markets or policymakers.

A conservative estimate suggests that around US$1 trillion will be required over the next 15 years to expand supply across these five metals alone. Copper accounts for the largest share. Aluminium and nickel follow. Lithium and cobalt, while smaller in absolute capital terms, require the most dramatic percentage increases in output.

This implies:

  • Doubling investment rates compared with the previous decade for several metals.

  • Sanctioning projects today for supply needed in the early 2030s.

  • Accepting that permitting, financing and construction cycles cannot be compressed indefinitely.

The transition may be urgent, but geology is not.

Geopolitics and Concentration Risk

I believe that material dependency introduces strategic exposure. Cobalt supply, for example, is heavily concentrated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which is expected to account for the vast majority of global production this decade. Lithium processing is geographically clustered. Nickel supply chains are shifting but remain regionally concentrated.

Battery manufacturers are responding through thrifting, recycling and alternative chemistries. Policymakers are pursuing “friendshoring”¹ and domestic supply strategies.

But substitution has limits. Diversification takes time. And recycling can only scale meaningfully once there is sufficient material in circulation.

In the interim, primary supply remains indispensable.

The ESG Paradox

Mining sits at the heart of an uncomfortable paradox.

The same investors and governments calling for accelerated decarbonisation often apply increasingly stringent environmental and social standards that extend project timelines and raise capital costs.

Higher carbon prices, tighter permitting, community opposition and political risk all weigh on investment decisions.

Yet without new mines, refineries and processing capacity, the transition simply cannot proceed at speed.

The solution is not to dilute standards. It is to modernise them — to create stable, transparent regulatory frameworks that allow responsible projects to advance predictably and efficiently.

Clarity reduces risk. Risk attracts capital.

Timing Is Everything

Metals markets are cyclical. Investment tends to follow price signals, often too late. Today’s hesitancy can become tomorrow’s shortage.

Given that a new mine can take five to seven years — often longer — to reach production, decisions deferred in the early 2020s risk supply constraints in the 2030s, precisely when electrification should be accelerating most sharply.

This is the central coordination challenge of the energy transition: aligning long-cycle supply industries with fast-moving policy ambition.

A Strategic Industry for a Strategic Era

For much of the past generation, mining was treated as upstream, distant and politically peripheral.

That era is over.

Base metals are not ancillary to the energy transition; they are its precondition. The decarbonised economy will not be virtual. It will be built — physically, materially and at scale.

The serious conversation now is not whether demand will grow. It will.

The questions are sharper:

  • Can capital be mobilised in time?

  • Can supply chains diversify without fragmenting?

  • Can ESG standards and strategic urgency be reconciled?

  • Can governments provide the policy stability that long-term investment requires?

The energy transition will be judged not only by its ambition, but by its execution. And execution, in the end, is a matter of metals.

Notes:

¹ Friendshoring" critical minerals is a geopolitical strategy, primarily driven by the U.S. and its allies, to secure supply chains for technologies like batteries and renewables by shifting sourcing, processing, and manufacturing to politically aligned, trusted nations. This approach aims to reduce dependency on China—which dominates, for example, 85% of rare earth element processing—by forming partnerships with countries like Australia, India, and Japan, or via frameworks like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). 

References:

  1. Critical minerals: The one issue COP has forgotten about — Global Witness, 09 June 2025.

  2. International Energy Agency – Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 (Executive Summary)

  3. Cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo : Market Analysis — World Bank


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